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Observers of the fragmenting scene in
Iraq have now had to adjust to a militant Shi'ite
uprising, to add to the Sunni dissidents and the
well-armed adherents of Saddam Hussein, in
addition to foreign fighters, loosely described as
al-Qaeda. It complicates matters more that the
Shi'ites fighting and dying at the same time that
some Sunni factions are in open revolt, are also
challenging the mainstream who observe the
guidance of the moderate and older Grand Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani - perhaps the highest ranking
Ayatollah in Shi'ism. A personal and rival faction
spearheaded by a militia called the Mahdi army, is
controlled by the militant cleric Moqtada al-Sadr,
the firebrand grandson of a former Ayatollah
(executed in 1980), and son of Mohammed Sadiq
al-Sadr, assassinated by Saddam's people in 1999,
who has been opposing the American occupation
since April 2003. He is suspected of having
ordered the assassination of Ayatollah Kho'i, who
returned from exile in Iran and was said to be
favorable to American intervention, shortly after
Saddam was toppled on April 7th.
As the
uprising of the Shi'ites in recent weeks
demonstrates, there has been a tendency on the
side of the mainstream media to describe this
movement as a monolithic entity, which adheres to
a single-minded aspiration to establish an Islamic
government in Iraq. In fact, the shi'ite movement
is much more complex than that and its history
shows that Iraqi shi'ites, as in Lebanon and Iran,
have embraced a variety of political ideas, some
of which are distinctly secular in orientation. As
any hopes of a genuine democratic outcome in Iraq
will have to contend with the aspirations of the
Shi'ite majority, the history of its politics
suggests that it is not a monolithic entity, which
necessarily wants to institute a religious
government based on a system such as is found in
Iran. Similarly, the recent wave of Shi'ite
resistance to American occupation is much more a
movement of Iraqi nationalist resistance to
occupation than it is a 'revolution'' to establish
an Islamic Republic, and in this case largely
motivated by the ambitions of Moqtada al- Sadr to
have a place at any eventual Iraqi
top-table.
The politicization of the Iraqi
Shi'ites in recent history resulted from a
reactionary response to secular policies
championed by the government as well as its main
opposition in the form of the Communist party.
From the mid 50's to the period immediately
preceding the American occupation, Iraq's policies
were distinctly secular. The process of
secularization had been from the very outset one
that targeted education in a special way. As early
as the 1950's, the traditional madrasas and their
students saw their funding decline considerably.
Consequently, the Ulama lost their traditional
monopoly on the shaping of public opinion, as
secular institutions based on 'Western' models
exercised ever-increasing influence.
This
transformation of society presented the Ulama with
what may be expressed as three problems. The
number of clerics and religious scholars declined;
those who were left had fewer funds and income and
lower status and their traditional role in society
eroded to the point where the future became
uncertain. As Shi'ite clerics had typically
received little, if any, financial support from
the state, their income was almost entirely
dependent on their degree of public influence. The
higher the community's perception of a cleric's
status, the higher the income he might receive
from public donations. To understand the dramatic
nature of the social shift that took place, it is
necessary to note that for centuries, Ulama had
traditionally commanded authority in such areas of
public concern as justice, education and welfare.
Secularism clearly undermined their socio-economic
position.
The lower ranks of the clergy and
religious students were the most marginalized
ones, as they depended on endowments from the high
ranking clerics, the 'mujtahids', who in turn had
fewer donations to dispense. The Shi'ites
establishment were especially concerned about the
Ba'ath party and their Arab Nationalism. While
General Qasim, whom Saddam Hussein tried to murder
in 1959, was in power - until the Ba'ath Coup of
1963-the communist party also wielded influence.
The Ulama was literally blocked by two forces,
which advocated policies that were almost entirely
antagonistic to their social status. As rural
migrants increasingly moved to urban centers
settling in shantytowns steeped in squalor and
poverty they became especially receptive to the
egalitarian message of the Communists. Moreover,
as the Shi'ites of Lebanon experienced, the state
neglected agriculture prompting many Shi'ite
peasants to abandon the land and migrate to the
cities fueling the growth of the 'bidonvilles'.
The Communists' potential base of support had
suddenly become very wide.
It is not that
the Shi'ites rural migrants - peasants - were
fickle; rather, they were not deeply committed to
Shi'ism as an ideology. Most Shi'ites expressed
their faith in a way that bordered on
superstition. They participated in the annual
festival of Ashura (whose most recent
manifestation in the holy City of Karbala was
marred by terror and 190 victims). In neighboring
Iran, the commitment to Shi'ism was deeper as the
Clergy there had enjoyed a far higher status under
the Qajar Shiá Dynasty. The Sunni Ottomans in
Iraq, on the other hand, had been very reluctant
to empower Iraq's Shi'ite establishment.
Therefore, even prior to the secularist policies
of the post-war period, the proportion of mullahs
to population was relatively low and there were
very few that could be sent to rural areas, many
villages did not even have a mullah. This meant
that a large number of the shi'ite migrants to the
cities had neither political nor religious
indoctrination to hamper the recruitment efforts
of the communists.
Shi'ites indoctrination
was mostly a phenomenon witnessed at the higher
level of the Shi'ites' hierarchy in the scholarly
establishments of the large and historically
important urban centers such as Baghdad, and the
holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. This was where
opposition to secular policies and ideology was
coming from. The Shi'ites establishment no doubt
had plenty to lose at a very practical level from
the secular policies of the Qasim and later Ba'ath
governments. General Qasim initiated a program of
land reforms in 1958 that hurt many property
owners, the traditional financial backers of the
Shi'ite clergy. Further reforms, such as the
provision of equal inheritance rights for women
and the abolition of polygamy countered the
clergy's ideological positions. Even those young
Shi'ites who moved to the slums of the cities in
the later period of the monarchy were drawn to the
Communist Party rather than the Shi'ite hierarchy.
Ironically, the party inspired by the Ayatollah
Baqr al-Sadr (Grandfather of the Moqtada al-Sadr,
the scourge of Paul Bremer), Al-Dawa Al-Islamiya
appealed to more educated and prosperous strata of
the Shi'ites and included some professionals. The
party stressed the atheist nature of communism to
win back Communist
sympathizers.
Nevertheless, the Shi'ites
had less to worry about from the Communists. After
the Ba'ath took over with a coup in 1963, the
communists became highly restricted in their
activities. By the early 1970's it is acknowledged
that they had been virtually silenced. Indeed,
under the Ba'ath all secular opposition suffered;
whereas, political grievances were increasingly
channeled through the Islamic movement. The
Shi'ites were poor, but well represented
politically during the monarchy; four of eight
prime ministers from 1947 to 1958 had been
Shi'ites. However, there were few Shi'ites in the
armed forces reducing their upward mobility after
the Ba'athists took over. From a practical
perspective, this meant that the Shi'ites clergy
wielded only marginal influence to the lower-rank
soldiers, as the Revolutionary Command Council -
RCC - had not one single Shi'ites member from 1968
to 1977. Even at the regional command level, the
Ba'ath was almost entirely dominated by the
Tikriti clan to which belonged Saddam Hussein and
his predecessor Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr.
Many
such Tikriti officials occupied important posts
despite their limited education and preparation
for office - some were promoted to technically
demanding posts as directors of industrial
corporations. The Shi'ites were very resentful
over the absence of meritocratic standards.
Interestingly, records of Islamic activists, who
died in jail in the early 80's show that many were
highly educated. In a group of 32 people, only
three were not graduates of institutions of higher
learning. The numbers also reveal that the
Shi'ites opposition in Iraq emerged in the 1970's
- just as in Lebanon. The Ashura processions held
on the 10th of Muharram (the first month of the
Islamic Calendar) served as the platform for
anti-government protest. The events of Ashura 2004
in March marked the rebirth of this tradition. In
1977 thousands were arrested and many killed as
the army tried to quell demonstrations. The fierce
reaction to these revolts indicated the regime's
assessment of the potential strength of the
Islamic movement. Indeed, Saddam began to adopt a
carrot and stick policy of co-optation in the late
70's which would mark much of his dealings with
the Shi'ites until his demise in
2003.
While his forces repressed revolts,
the government of Saddam Hussein increased
religious endowments and gifts to the Ulama and
declared the birthday of the Imam Ali, the central
figure in the Shi'ism practiced in Iraq, Lebanon
and Iran, a national holiday. During the Gulf War
of 1990-91 Saddam Hussein even altered the Iraqi
flag by adding the holy words "Allahu- Akbar"
(more or less "God is Great"). This is very
significant, as the Ba'ath frowned on religious
expression. Nevertheless, membership in the
Al-Dawa party remained punishable by death.
Ultimately, the politicization of the Iraqi
Shi'ites began as a reaction to the secular
policies adopted by the post monarchical
governments in Iraq since 1958. The demise of the
Iraqi Communist Party under Ba'ath rule and the
tribal - Takriti- basis of advancement within the
political hierarchy left the Islamic party and the
Shi'ites as the only vehicle of opposition - its
operations facilitated by the religious
infrastructure of mosques and religious
institutions, which, although financially weaker,
had never been illegal. The Iraqi Shi'ite movement
got a boost after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in
Iran. Supporters of Baqr al-Sadr (uncle to
Moqtada) demonstrated in Najaf and met the fierce
response of the army. Many were killed and
arrested. The famous Ayatollah al-Sadr, also
learned to advocate armed struggle from his
contemporaries in Iran and Lebanon.
The
movement in Iraq had until the early 1980's been
civil in nature. After the Revolution in Iran, it
also adopted a militant strategy, which carried
out acts of defiance and guerrilla actions against
key government targets. Famously, there was an
assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein in August
1979 and Tariq Aziz, deputy minister, April 1980.
The government responded with increased repression
and started to expel large numbers of Shi'ites -
over 53,000 between 1980 and 1982 alone- into the
Bakhtiar region of Iran. Al-Dawa members were
persecuted and many voluntarily left Iraq. The
Dawa leadership settled in Teheran. Saddam Hussein
also offered his usual carrot. Many Shi'ites were
offered access to good government posts as well as
the Party structure itself. By 1987 over 33% of
the Ba'ath leadership was Shi'ite. The principal
areas of Shi'ite revolt such as Najaf, Karbala and
Saddam City (now Sadr City) were the object of
renovations and infrastructural improvements in
the form of greater access to running water,
electricity and paved roads for their
population.
Conclusions and Prospects
for American Success
The implications
of this intractable situation for the United
States and its occupation of Iraq are crucial. As
many scholars indicated prior to the war in 2003,
you cannot even begin to discuss democratization,
as it is understood in the west, without
considering the Islamic political reality that
much of the Middle East and North Africa have to
face. Because of decades of repression of secular
opposition forces, and through a variety of social
mechanisms, the region is now left to contend with
a well-organized and rooted Islamic political
reality. The suppression of the Ba'ath left a
political vacuum, which clearly could not be
sustained. There was no tradition of democracy
waiting to fill the gap and indeed little
understanding of the concept - there are after
all, no Arab democracies.
Ethnicity has
united the Kurds to the north. The Sunni did not
have a faith-inspired party as such - Saddam's
Takriti tribe happened to be Sunni, but the regime
was essentially secular. By repressing the Islamic
parties, even though by seeking to remain outside
the law in this most recent outbreak, this faction
appears to have provoked the military response,
targeting "to kill or capture," Moqtada al-Sadr
will not deter the Shi'ites. As was all too
evident in Lebanon, and even during the determined
attacks of the Saddam Hussein era in Iraq, the
Shi'ites have adopted an unprecedented militancy,
which combined with the theological message of
sacrifice has proven to be formidable. After many
years of fighting Israel had to withdraw from
Lebanon and still engages Hizbollah across its
borders.
The United States will no doubt be
forced to contend with an Iraqi, and far stronger,
version of Hizbollah if they do not face the
Shi'ites question politically. Algeria, tried to
prevent the Islamic parties from taking power
after they won overwhelmingly in the elections of
1992. That resulted in a civil war, whose
repercussions are still being felt today after
tens of thousands of people died. By not seeking a
political solution to the Shi'ites' 'party' (Shi'a
in Arabic means party) and Moqtada al-Sadr, the US
administration will be considered to be yet
another and foreign version of Saddam Hussein. The
former president and the Ba'ath party were
dedicated secularists, who repressed the Shi'ites
as they espoused an entirely different model of
society. Indeed, the Ba'ath espoused social and
economic realities far closer to those of the West
than what might be expected from the Shi'ites
militants. Indeed, what does political Islam
offer? What are Shi'ites leaders such as Moqtada
al-Sadr advocating?
One aspect of the
appeal of political Islam is clear. Islamists have
re-evaluated Islam as a political force. Unlike
secular political programs, the Islamic political
agenda has largely neglected economics. Islamic
politics are essentially about culture and speak
of dress codes, sexual mores, the family, and the
enforcement of social conformity to the tenets of
piety. Principally, Islamists have argued that the
Shari'a (Islamic law) offers a solution to
government that is in accordance with principles
set out by God. However, they have not provided an
analysis of the current state of affairs or a
solution to the economic and social problems that
the Islamic world is actually facing. The Shari'a
has mostly been reclaimed as a symbol of pride and
identity that for many Muslims was lost when
emerging Islamic States applied institutional and
constitutional reforms in the 19th and 20th
centuries to emulate the Western model precisely
by refuting the Shari'a.
The introduction
of Western legal systems has been considered a
major aspect of 'cultural imperialism', while the
current revival of the Islamic heritage
constitutes an act of cultural affirmation.
Moreover, conscious of the mobilizing power of
Islamic symbols, even Arab secular ideologies
fomented the political role of Islam. Nasser in
post-war Egypt promoted the idea of Jihad as an
ideological concept to mobilize the people against
internal or external enemies while the struggle
against Western imperialism was veiled in
religious terms. Under President Sadat, religious
symbolism was renewed to portray the new
president's distance from socialism and the
Shari'a was officially, if not practically,
considered as the principal source of legislation.
The economic hardship of the '70s was diverted by
the State's promotion of Islamic guidance as the
means to revive moral character. Whereas, the
Industrial revolution in Europe was an indigenous
response to inherently European phenomena of the
Renaissance, religious reform and the
Enlightenment, Islamic nations only partly
borrowed or imitated these developments without an
appropriate cultural frame of
reference.
Prominent religious figures such
as Ayatollah Baqr al-Sadr in Iraq or Musa al-Sadr
in Lebanon have articulated a reformist and
revolutionary brand of Islam that has transformed
it from a religious denomination to a political
force. This movement has long opposed secularism
and radicalized among the religiously conscious
intelligentsia and lower classes as the most
significant opposition in Iraq as well as many
other parts of the Islamic world. The Islamic
political revival represents the search for a
formula for political organization that is
indigenous and culturally relevant to the Middle
East. If allowing the Shi'ites parties to
participate fully in the type of democratic
process, which the US had promised, its
'liberation' of Iraq will increasingly be
associated with those governments throughout the
Middle East that use the phenomenon of Islamic
political militancy to resist extending more
political and social freedoms, while justifying
the use of repressive police and security forces.
It is a losing battle of course. Given the revived
cultural relevance and the socio-economic links
that have enabled the formation of grass roots
Islamic movements, it is inevitable that Islamic
politics will be an important component of any
democratizing effort in Iraq as well as the
Islamic world at large. At the same time, we
should not make the mistake of considering the
shi'ite community as monolithic, far from
it.
As noted above, many shi'ites were
involved in secular political movements ranging
from the communists to the Ba'athists. Those
advocating more religiously inclined politics have
also argued over different concepts of the shi'ite
political thought that developed in the seventies
and eighties around the movement that resulted in
the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the
mobilization of Hizbollah and Amal in Lebanon. One
of the main points of contention has been the
concept of 'velayat-e faqih' or rule of the
jurisconsult, the constitutional basis of the
current Iranian government. In the '80's there was
also cooperation among secular minded and shi'ite
opposition groups in resisting the rule of Saddam
Hussein, but the latter's repressive tactics
strongly reduced their effectiveness. Since Saddam
Hussein was toppled, the Shi'ites seemed to be
divided among those who support Ayatollah Ali
Sistani, undoubtedly the highest living Shi'ite
authority and the young Moqtada al-Sadr. The
latter has challenged religious authorities, who
seemed willing to cooperate with the American
occupiers and trained his personal militia now
known as the 'Mahdi Army', much the same way as
Sheikh Fadlallah developed the militia known as
Hizbollah to fight the Israeli occupation of
Lebanon in 1982. The US governor of Iraq, Paul
Bremer's order to shut down Moqtada al-Sadr's
newspaper and the issuing of his arrest warrant
sparked his militia and more, the already grieving
population, into revolt.
With such
prospects, how can the US ever succeed to pacify
and stabilize Iraq by advocating what is
essentially a Western model of society? Many
advised the US against invading Iraq for that
reason. Even if a political solution to the
Shi'ites were found and applied, the Sunnis of the
Central and Northern areas of Iraq would not
easily accept the rule of Shi'ites clerical
authorities. Iraq is not Iran. What will
happen to the important and influential Christian
minority, and the Kurds?
It is,
unfortunately, easier to conceive the unveiling of
a Lebanese scenario for Iraq than the one of
stability and progress the Americans were supposed
to provide. The ongoing military occupation will
only serve to strengthen and radicalize already
determined rebel forces on the Sunni side, but
also on the Shi'ite side, undermining the Iraqi
Governing Council's legitimacy. In fact, the ghost
of the Lebanon of the 1980s looms all over the
future of the Iraq. This ghost could take the form
of a civil war, but not one that necessarily pits
different religious factions against each other as
much as one aimed against the American occupying
forces who will remain for a time after June 30th
and those Iraqis who cooperate. Certainly, the
growing popularity of Moqtada al-Sadr in mostly
Sunni Fallujah suggests that the anti-American
sentiment cuts across all
denominations.
Perhaps, faced with
increasingly insoluble problems in nation
building, Washington will hold it's breath until
the June 30th handover of power, and pass the buck
of creating the successor state to that of Saddam,
to the Iraqi administration to solve in an 'Iraqi'
way, and leave them to perhaps call on the UN for
practical assistance. The US can then take credit
for enabling a new beginning, give a military
back-up for a limited time but see it's own exit
clear, a vital domestic political consideration.
Whether what is left becomes the first Arab
democracy, will be a fascinating if currently, an
unlikely outcome.
a newnations.com
SPECIAL REPORT
Author: Alessandro
Bruno an Analyst of Middle East and North African
Politics, a former UN Officer and PhD
student.
Middle
East: Shi-ites call the Shots (2008)
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