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Books on Syria

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Update No: 043 - (29/05/07)
"Black May"
Echoing some of the worse internal battles since the 1975-1990 civil war in
Lebanon, on Sunday May 20th, fighting broke out at the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian
refugee camp in northern Lebanon near Tripoli between the newly formed terror
group 'Fatah al-Islam' and the regular Lebanese Army. The founder of the new
group is a Palestinian named Shaker al-Abssi, whose stated goal is to establish
Islamic law in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and eventually destroy
both the United States and Israel. Al-Abssi reportedly broke from Arafat's Fatah
and set up a base in Syria, though the Syrians did not welcome his presence and
held him in prison for three years on charges of terrorism. Even Hamas has
renounced him (interesting as Hamas is once again engaged in a battle against
Fatah and Israel in Gaza). Surely, such a presence suggests that there is a
growing risk of Sunni Islamic radicalism and violence in Lebanon; it also adds
to the list of Lebanese problems that the anti-Syrian factions within and
outside Lebanon can blame on Syria.
The suggestion of a link between Fatah al-Islam to Alawite Syria (Militant
Islamists have never been welcome in Syria, and the Alawi are heretics according
to Salafist) - is without merit. The Alawites are not even remotely
ideologically aligned to a group like Fatah al-Islam. However naturally, since
many (and some powerful) people want it that way, Syria is not being excluded as
the party to blame. It could be involved in future, if the manifestation of this
new islamist radical group serves as the excuse to purge Lebanon of all islamist
organizations, Sunni and Shiite, including Hezbollah, which does have close
links to Syria. But the fact is that Lebanon alone, is almost certainly
incapable of eradicating the islamist groups to whom they find themselves
involuntarily playing host.
Syria's detractors have gone on beyond pointing the finger of blame at Damascus,
by suggesting that Syria's motivation in "shaking up the Lebanese
scene" is a refusal by president Bashar al-Asad to recognize the
U.N.-mandated international tribunal on the assassination of the former prime
minister Rafiq Hariri, should it infringe on Syrian sovereignty. This implies
that Syria would refuse to cooperate with the court if it indicts Syrian
citizens in the assassination, which is quite likely to happen. The Syrian
attitude and 'tribunal' crisis has left Lebanon unable to resolve its political
crisis, where Syrian ally Hezbollah, stalled the political process by
withdrawing five ministers from the cabinet.
At the time of writing in the fighting between the Lebanese army and the
islamists, at least 100 people were killed, including militants, soldiers and
civilians after three days of combat. Several refugees from the camp have been
forced to move to other camps in the Tripoli area, testifying to the ferocity of
the hostilities, but the Lebanese army was wise enough not to storm the camp in
search of the terror suspects. That risk remains of course, as the Lebanese
government issued an ambiguous statement suggesting that all options were being
considered to deal with the situation. The Fatah al-Islam group, which many have
suggested is the Lebanese branch of al-Qaida - if the infamous organization were
engaged in awarding franchises, made its first violent mark by bombing a bus
last March. The group is claimed by others to be an offshoot of the Fatah al-Intifadah,
related to the Fatah organization founded by Yasser Arafat, but its leader and
several of its members are identified as veterans of the fighting in Iraq basing
themselves in the Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon.
Echoes of the Past
The sudden appearance of the group, the timing (in view of the ongoing
political standoff in Lebanon) of its attacks and the overall strategic
situation in the Middle East region echo the Lebanese civil war, when
Palestinians in the refugee camps had to face a Lebanese (the Maronites and even
the Shiites, among others) and an Israeli enemy. It also calls to mind the
radicalization of the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) in
Jordan, who emerged on the scene after the 1967 Six-Day war in a series of
hijackings between 1967 and 1970 that culminated in the blowing up of three
airliners in a former British airfield in Jordan, Dawson's Field, and by taking
on the Jordanian army and King Hussein in the weeks that followed. That struggle
became known as 'Black September'. It resulted in the PLO survivors and their
families being expelled from Jordan in July 1971. The heavily-armed PLO found a
new home in Lebanon and inevitably forced their way into becoming another player
in the political life of their unfortunate host country. Less than a decade
later Palestinian militants were involved in skirmishes with the Israelis, who
retaliated, often causing heavy loss of life among the civilian population.
This short flashback is intended to put the current situation in the Middle East
into perspective. It also suggests that little has changed. The Palestinian
problem is still the thorn that won't go away and the one problem that has both
united the Arabs against their common enemy of Israel, as well as divided them
over that very same common enemy. The real issues that few have presented in
accounting for the renewed violence involving Palestinian refugees in Lebanon,
is that they live in absolutely miserable conditions, completely isolated from
the rest of the country, condemned to abject poverty, and unable to find proper
employment or even an education. The ensuing desperation no doubt creates
fertile ground for rebel groups to establish themselves and recruit the hopeless
young, with ease.
Intrigue and Rumours
Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora reiterated he would use an iron fist
approach to deal with Fatah al-Islam, but life conditions for the refuges at the
Nahr al Bared camp remain treacherous, and can only get worse. Moreover, the
events at Nahr al-Bared only serve to remind the over 430,000 Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon of the horror they faced in 1982, the Israeli invasion,
Sabra and Shatila and the all too many tragedies they have had to endure.
Interestingly, much of the population in the camp initially supported the
Lebanese army against Fatah al-Islam; however, local sources suggested that the
Lebanese army's operations have ended up targeting civilians directly, such as
to possibly turn the popular feeling in defence of Fatah al-Islam, not to
mention the political consequences in Lebanon. The editor of the London based
Palestinian newspaper 'al-Quds al-Arabi', Abdel Bari Atwan, said the soldiers
were incompetent in dealing with the crisis, leading to the death of many
soldiers. The high number of casualties then clouded the operations with a
vengeful approach that targeted innocents instead of the militants. The risk
remains that there could be a high political price to be paid if a negotiated
solution is not found to the Fatah al-Islam problem, leading to further loss of
Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps. Just as on several other occasions,
from the events of Black September to those of Lebanon in the mid-1970s, the
Palestinian refugees can serve as the wild card that triggers regional
conflicts.
Continued tensions with the Palestinians would inevitably draw Syria, directly
or indirectly. Indeed, Syria is already involved, as the Druze leader -
predictably - has once again accused Syria this time of having exported Fatah
al-Islam into Lebanon. Jumblatt is not the only one to blame Syria, even as
Syria has flatly denied any involvement and closed its border with Lebanon, when
the fighting started. Certainly, the secular Ba'athist regime in Syria has
nothing to gain in supporting Salafi radicals, who are as much a threat to its
own survival as that of any secular Arab state. Moreover, even as Syria faces
renewed accusations of meddling in Lebanese affairs, several sources including
Seymour Hersh, who is well connected to international intelligence, have
indicated that rather than being a Syrian creation, prime minister Fouad Siniora
and other 'anti-Syrians' like Saad Hariri willingly allowed Fatah al-Islam to
set a base in Lebanon in order to counter the rising power of Shi'ite Hezbollah,
especially after the Israeli military setback in the summer of 2006. Salafists
who are Sunni, consider Shiites to be heretics (and vice versa).
There is also the issue of ascending Iranian influence in the region, which some
Saudis (Prince Bandar) and other Sunni states like Jordan, as well as the United
States, are trying to contain by promoting radical Sunni groups, as if the
region's convoluted situation can be balanced like a simple equation. During an
interview, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah hinted to Seymour Hersh that he was more
afraid of being assassinated by other Arabs than by Israelis. The Nahr al-Bared
residents said that Fatah al-Islam members, including non-refugees and
non-Palestinians such as Saudis, Pakistanis, Algerians and Tunisians settled in
their camp in September 2006. Camp residents have described them as being very
involved in praying and military training, rather than offering help to the
population (the Hezbollah tactic for support). This is at first sight odd, as
Nahr al-Bared has the highest percentage of abjectly poor Palestinian refugees
anywhere, prime targets for the kind of approach favoured by Hezbollah. Perhaps,
unlike Hezbollah, who had Iran to fund their generosity there is no comparable
source of funding for the islamists of Fatah al- Islam and why they were, as we
were told, engaged in robbing a bank
Conspiracy Theories
In the absence at this stage of hard facts, we report unconfirmed rumors
that a certain 'Welch Club' exists, named after David Welch, assistant to
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and involved in an operation led by Eliot
Abrams.
The 'Club' is said to include such members as Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri.
The Welch Club is said to be financing various Sunni radical groups in Lebanon,
placing them in Palestinian refugee camps, with the purpose of triggering a
Sunni-Shi'a civil war. The bank robbery that preceded the Nahr al-Bared violent
episode was, allegedly, retaliation for failed payments, due to cold feet from
Welch Club handlers. This account is based on an elaboration of Hersh's
investigations and remains unproven; nevertheless what is certain is that Syria
could have done without being blamed for yet another problem in the Lebanon.
Interestingly, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, in the weeks that preceded the
Nahr al Bared incident, was indicating some frustration with the 'March 14'
coalition, the political faction led by Saad Hariri that is trying to isolate
Syria. At the latest Arab summit in Riyadh, King Abdallah put Syria at centre
stage, indicating disapproval with the Siniora leadership, by also inviting the
pro-Syrian president of Lebanon, Emile Lahoud. Syria also won another diplomatic
breakthrough with the United States when it held, a 30 minutes meeting, which
was the first high- level contact between the two countries since the US
recalled its ambassador from Damascus in 2005, after the assassination of Rafiq
Hariri. It remains to be seen what diplomatic repercussions the Fatah al-Islam
incident will have. Syria appeared to have improved its regional and
international standing after the bullying and demonization of the past two
years, but if allegations continue with more off-the-wall suggestions that this
latest unpleasant gang of islamist terrorists is a proxy of theirs, despite
rather convincing evidence that it is not so. Then this probable invention of
the many enemies they have made by their past deeds in Lebanon, and with those
US and Israeli propagandists happy enough to belabour them with any stick that
comes to hand, then some of the mud will be bound to attach.
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