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Books on Pakistan
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Update No: 022 - (27/11/07)
Musharraf does it again
Musharraf's declaration of the state of emergency in November caught many
external observers by surprise, given that Washington had seemed to have
successfully persuaded him to backtrack in August. In Pakistan, however, a
feeling that something was going to happen had been building up for some days.
Given that Musharraf's first actions were to remove the President of the Supreme
Court and arrest lawyers, it appears that he feared a sentence of the Supreme
Court against the legitimacy of his re-election, or at least that he was not
ready to take such a risk. Many outside observers had believed that the Supreme
Court would have confirmed his election, but Musharraf to whom it was critical,
might well have had better information. That would be the most likely single
factor in the decision to act in the way that he did which he must have known
would cause immense domestic and international ramifications
The state of emergency has indeed proved very unpopular among the population,
which responded with demonstrations in the main cities. Musharraf is now faced
with limited options: either he maintains the state of emergency and completely
alienates Washington, or he rapidly abolishes it but faces criticism because his
claim to have acted to remedy the rising violence in the country would become
completely discredited. Moreover, any chance of a deal with Bhutto and the PPP
seems now to have disappeared. Bhutto and Musharraf have traded violent
accusations and the beating to death of two lawyers by the police makes any
prospect of reconciliation even more remote. Mass arrests of activists of both
the Muslim League and the PPP do not help either. Bhutto has regained political
credibility by taking a firm stand against the emergency rule and returning to
the country after Musharraf's declaration from a trip abroad.
Musharraf's dilemmas
Although Musharraf has confirmed in public that he will leave the army before
the end of November (he had previously agreed to do so by 15 November), such a
move would further weaken him as he would no longer be able to count on the
unwavering loyalty of the army while at the same time it being too little to
regain the confidence of the public. Will Musharraf really want to become a very
weak civilian president, with an army which might be beginning to consider him a
liability? He has declared that elections will take place in February, but
Bhutto has indicated that her party may not participate unless the State of
Emergency is lifted. She, now released from House arrest, has also announced an
alliance with her main political rival Nawaz Sharif, to work for the removal of
Musharraf. To say that the situation is fluid hardly describes the uncertainties
that now predominate.
If he proceeds to organise clean parliamentary elections, he will surely face a
majority hostile to him. If he rigs the elections too drastically, he will
further embarrass an already very embarrassed Washington, which is threatening
to suspend his aid program, even if nobody believes that they will actually do
it. The Americans are also worried by the deterioration of the situation in the
North-West Frontier Province, where Taliban-like elements continue to advance
meeting little resistance by army and paramilitaries. Deputy Secretary of State
Negroponte travelled to Islamabad to discuss matters with Musharraf, who is
likely to continue to exploit the situation, benefiting from incompetent
American diplomacy (they probably made it too clear to him that they had no
alternative but support him) and from the geostrategic windfall of sitting next
to Afghanistan. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that either Bhutto
or Nawaz Sharif can make a better fist of fighting the fundamentalist Islamics
or the frontier tribals, once more in rebellion which might indeed be a higher
priority - at this time- for the international community, if not for the
chattering classes of Pakistan itself.
Economy so far hardly affected
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the main economic impact was that the
Karachi Stock exchange fell, but not dramatically. There are also rumours that
the Pakistani central bank injected $80 million to protect the rupee from a
speculative attack which might have significantly weakened it otherwise. The
latest IMF estimates, released in October, forecast GDP growth at 6.4% this year
and at 6.5% next year, while inflation is forecast at 7.8% and 7% respectively,
and no observer would for the moment being alter them. Bad news is that external
debt and liabilities rose to a new record at almost $41.7 billion in
July-September, but this is clearly unrelated to the political situation.
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