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Books on North Korea
REPUBLICAN REFERENCE
Area (sq.km)
120,540
Population
22,224,195 (July 2002 est.)
Capital
Pyongyang
Currency
North Korean won (KPW)
Leader
Kim Jong-il
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Update No: 040 - (29/08/06)
Are nukes next?
If missiles come, can nukes be far behind? After the ructions caused by
North Korea's test of seven missiles on July 5, August's most worrying news was
a report that spy satellites, which observed missile preparations some weeks
before the launch, were now seeing what might be preparations for a nuclear
test. While the story soon died down, analysts do not rule out such a
possibility - even though it would isolate Kim Jong-il's regime still further.
Meanwhile the DPRK's interlocutors strove to adjust to its new attitude of
defiance after the missile tests. There were indications that China was showing
its annoyance in practical ways, such as tightening border controls. South Korea
moved in the other direction, using severe floods in the North as a basis to
partially reverse its post-missile suspension of food aid - which always looked
untenable. Meanwhile the US campaign to squeeze Kim Jong-il's finances chalked
up new successes, with Vietnam reportedly closing DPRK accounts.
For its part Pyongyang denounced routine US-ROK war games as the real thing,
warning of its right to a pre-emptive strike. Such extravagant rhetoric is
routine, but the new climate of uncertainty since the missile tests
understandably created a certain nervousness.
Next, a nuke test?
One of North Korea's many mysteries is that, though claiming since last year
to possess a nuclear deterrent, it has yet to test a nuclear device. (It is
rumoured that Pakistan's rogue scientisr Dr AQ Khan may have helped in that
regard.) On August 17 ABC News in the US quoted an unnamed senior official as
saying spy satellites had observed suspicious vehicle movements and other signs,
including unloading large reels of cable, near Punggye-yok, a suspected nuclear
test site in northeastern North Korea. The source stated: "It is the view
of the intelligence community that a test is a real possibility." South
Korea's foreign ministry confirmed next day that both capitals were on high
alert, and President Bush warned North Korea not to do it. Others were more
sceptical, noting that such reports arise regularly; and that leaks calculated
to shape the debate, mainly by hawks, are routine in Washington.
Some analysts, however, reckon that the same logic by which Kim Jong-il defied
the world to launch seven missiles on July 5 may impel him to go the whole hog;
the reasoning being that only a test can confirm North Korea as a nuclear power
and force the US to deal with it more respectfully and seriously. The story soon
died down, but could flare up again on the precedent of the missile launch,
whose preparations were watched and debated for several weeks - with some
sceptical that Kim Jong-il would go ahead - before the actual event. For now, we
can only watch and wait. Our own view is that Kim would be very foolish to take
this extreme step right now; but then, nor did we expect him to actually fire
the missiles.
Southern U-turn on aid
As we did predict, South Korea's peculiar riposte to July's missile tests -
suspending food aid, while maintaining business cooperation - proved
unsustainable in the wake of serious flood damage in the North in July from
typhoon Ewiniar. The scale of this remains unclear. Whereas the UN put
casualties at 154 dead and 127 missing, the Seoul-based NGO Good Friends alleges
a disaster "of biblical proportions", as Time put it: with 54,700 dead
(many due to landslides); 2.5 million - over 10% of the population - rendered
homeless; and wide destruction of crops in major rice-growing regions. Even if
those figures are exaggerated, this is a severe blow to a country already barely
and minimally coping as regards food; yet which this year has spurned aid,
expelling foreign NGOs and forcing the UN World Food Programme (WFP) to curtail
its operations - which once fed up to 6 million North Koreans.
Facing pressure at home from public opinion to help their Northern brethren, the
ROK first on August 11 allocated US$10.5 million to support local NGOs which had
already stepped into the breach. Then on August 20 Seoul announced much
larger-scale official support, to be channelled via the Red Cross: 100,000 tons
of rice and the same weight of cement, along with iron rods, excavators and
trucks, plus blankets and medical kits. All this is worth over US$200 million;
it would cost less than half that if foreign rice were bought, but - as the ROK
unification ministry (MOU) frankly admitted - because of a local rice surplus
South Korea will send its own rice, at five times the price. As in the US, food
aid is in practice inseparable from the political economy of farm support.
Even with this aid, MOU reckons North Korea faces a grain shortfall of 1.5
million tons this year. Much of this deficit is chronic, but missile tests and
flooding have worsened it. Given that, and the South's own rice glut, Seoul will
come under pressure to reinstate the 500,000 tons of rice aid that it normally
sends each year. The South will hope to link any such retreat to concessions by
the North.
Washington tightens the noose
The financial squeeze which the US has pursued since last autumn appears to
be both biting and spreading, with Vietnam its latest focus. According to the
Financial Times on August 23, a visit to Hanoi in July by Stuart Levey, who as
US under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence is overseeing this
drive, led to the closing of several DPRK accounts there. A leaked Japanese
joint intelligence report, cited by Bloomberg, claims that since US pressure
forced the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia to freeze all DPRK accounts a year ago,
North Korea has established new links with 23 banks in 10 coutries - including
Mongolia and Russia, said to be among the few nations left where North Korea can
still bank.
Levey's itinerary also took in Japan, Singapore and South Korea. While Seoul had
earlier expressed dismay that this US pressure has stymied the six-party talks,
this time the ROK foreign ministry (MOFAT) echoed Washington's stern note,
saying it "has serious concerns about North Korea's illicit activities,
including counterfeiting," and urging Pyongyang to "take steps to
quell such worries in order to become a member of the international
society." Even so, Levey's line that "the US continues to encourage
financial institutions to carefully assess the risk of holding any North
Korea-related accounts" (emphasis added) makes this a very blunt
instrument: hitting legitimate trade and joint ventures as much as, indeed maybe
more than, the dodgy stuff - which will always find ways of going underground.
China chafes
Although not confirmed by Beijing, China (beyond Macau) is also said to have
joined the financial crackdown, with the state-owned Bank of China (BoC)
freezing or closing DPRK accounts. Reports from north-eastern China claim that
border trade has been curtailed, and that some North Koreans working without
permits in China - as distinct from refugees - have been deported. In July,
three refugees who had taken sanctuary in the US consulate in Shenyang were
allowed to fly direct to the US, most unusually.
Yet while China must protect itself financially, and may vent irritation with
Kim Jong-il in small ways, there is no sign of any large-scale sanctions or
squeeze. At a time when North Korea's capital needs and partial opening are
creating great opportunities for Chinese firms, and thereby also building
leverage for Beijing in Pyongyang, it would be self-defeating if China were to
over-react to the missile launch. A nuclear test might be a different matter.
Refugee raid in Bangkok
Refugees from North Korea returned to the headlines in August. A police raid
in Bangkok on August 22 arrested no fewer than 175, all staying in a two-storey
house; their numbers, unsurprisingly, drew attention. 80% were women, as is ever
more the trend. Such fugitives must still make a long trek across a hostile
China to find sanctuary in a third country; often aided by South Korean
missionaries, as here. Despite this raid, Thailand is friendlier than other
destinations like Vietnam and Laos, which as communist states are more heedful
of their ties with the DPRK. 16 of those arrested already had papers from the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and with two others were
swiftly flown to Seoul. It was expected that the rest would follow, after a
short spell in jail while UNHCR and the ROK government processed them.
The numbers are growing, with 400 North Koreans turning up in Thailand alone so
far this year. 1,054 reached the South in the first seven months of 2006: 59%
more than in the same period last year, whose total was down from 2004. These
are still tiny figures compared to the former two Germanys, or indeed most other
global refugee flows. All governments, in Beijing and Seoul no less than
Pyongyang, are fearful lest this trickle should swell into a mighty flood. North
Korea suspended most contacts with the South for almost a year after 468
defectors were flown out of Saigon to Seoul (at Vietnamese insistence) in July
2004, even though the ROK did its best to keep this airlift low-key. This time,
post-missiles, the South may prove less deferential to Northern sensitivities.
A new point man needed on the South
Rim Tong-ok, North Korea's point man on the South, died on August 20 aged
70, probably of lung cancer. As director of the United Front Department (UFD) of
the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), and vice-chairman of the Committee for
the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), Rim oversaw ties with South
Korea, his field since the early 1970s. As such he was well known in Seoul,
where the government sent condolences to Pyongyang, angering some; "Seoul
Condoles N. Korea on Death of Spymaster" was the headline in the right-wing
daily Chosun Ilbo. This was the South's second such gesture; the first being on
the death last year of the North's ex-premier, Yon Hyong-muk.
Speculation began at once in Seoul on who would succeed Rim. Most money is on
one of the UFD's two vice-directors: Ri Jong-hyok, an urbane ex-diplomat, and
Choe Sung-chol, a rising star. Also in the frame is CPRF vice-chairman An Kyong-ho,
notorious for warning that if the South's opposition Grand National Party (GNP)
comes to power - as it may well do in 2008 - Korea will be "enveloped in
the flames of war." Or Kim Jong-il may pick one of his own cronies, as is
increasingly his wont; some analysts attribute his missile test gaffe to the
dear leader being surrounded by yes-men who echo rather than query his judgment.
Another name cited is Kim's brother-in-law Jang Song-thaek, purged in 2003 but
reinstated earlier this year. None of this may happen quickly; Rim only got the
job two years after the death of his predecessor Kim Yong-sun, a former KWP
international secretary.
Still shuttling
Shuttle diplomacy among North Korea's interlocutors continues, if now less
in hopes of reviving the seemingly moribund six-party nuclear talks than of
creating a common front to respond to Pyongyang's provocations. On August 24 the
Japanese newsagency Kyodo said that Christopher Hill, who as assistant secretary
of state for East Asia is chief US delegate to the talks, will revisit the
region in early September. A particular aim according to Kyodo is to beef up
cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea. These used to regularly meet
at vice-minister level, but this Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG)
has lapsed since 2003. While all unity helps, it seems tactless to exclude China
at a time when Beijing is crosser with Kim Jong-il than ever before.
In late August rumours arose that Kim Jong-il may soon visit China for what
would be his second visit this year. While there are certainly fences to be
mended with Beijing over the missile tests and fears of a nuclear follow-up,
this may be too soon. Any such visit would no doubt be nominally secret, as
before. By contrast, South Korea's President Roh Moo-hyun announced a visit to
China, set for mid-October. No doubt he and Hu Jintao, who both support engaging
North Korea, will scratch their heads over how to maintain this when the Dear
Leader's defiance makes it so difficult for them. There are no easy answers.
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