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Books on Iraq
REPUBLICAN REFERENCE
Area (sq.km)
437,072
Population
24,001,816 (July 2002 est.)
Capital
Baghdad
Currency
Iraqi dinar (IQD)
President
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Update No: 042 - (26/10/06)
Hydrocarbon law nearer?
Iraqi oil production continues to fluctuate wildly, due to sabotage and
infrastructural problems. In August it had reached 2.2 million bpd, but
preliminary data for September showed an average of 1.7 million bpd only. The
new hydrocarbon law is now expected to be approved by the year's end, but in
reality the issue of the role of regional government in controlling oil revenue
has not been sorted yet. By the end of September the Iraqi autonomous government
was going as far as threatening secession over the refusal of the central
government to agree to the Kurdish authorities' right to sign oil contracts. The
Kurds exploit the ambiguity of the constitution with regard to the control over
newly signed oil contracts (as opposed to existing ones) and claim that
Kurdistan is the only region to have attracted any investment in the oil
industry since 2003 (about US$100 million). The local authorities estimate
reserves within the Kurdish region at around 45 billion barrels of oil and 100
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
Cleaning up the house
Official efforts by the Iraqi authorities to check the spread of corruption
peaked up in October, when the Commission on Public Integrity issued arrest
warrants against 15 current and past ministers. The enquiry is also revealing
the existence of many thousands of ghost state employees, of public servants who
have conflicts of interests because they hold two public positions and other
improprieties. According to the Commission, there are 1,200 pending cases of
corruption and US$7 billion are estimated to have been embezzled. The Commission
accuses US and British authorities of doing little to help the investigation. It
is not clear whether this is because some of their protégés are involved too,
as implied by the Commission, or because, as several observers believe, the
anti-corruption drive might be an expedient to rid key factions in the
government of political rivals.
Confrontation with the militias and death squads underway
After much hesitation, during October finally the Iraqi government began to
tackle the issue of rogue elements of the security forces pursuing their own
private war against rival groups. Several high ranking police officers were
removed and whole units suspended as part of an assessment of the performance of
the forces of the Ministry of Interior. At the same time, efforts to disarm
non-state militias were renewed, leading to bloody armed clashes in particular
with Muqtada as-Sadr's men in a number of localities. However, in this case too
there are widespread suspicions that what is really going on is the replacement
of one faction with another. After the Sadrists broke with the government, they
were singled out for a purge, while many Shia parliamentarians accuse the
Minister of Interior Bolani of being intent on filling the police with old
Baathists.
A federal Iraq
On 11 October the Parliament approved with a slim majority a law which
divides the country in three regions and allows each of Iraq's governatorates to
hold referendums about which region to join. A compromise with the Sunni leaders
was achieved in September, on which basis the creation of the autonomous regions
will be postponed until 2008, although that did not prevent the Sunnis from
boycotting the voting of the new law. Federalism was approved with the support
of the Kurds and the Shia factions, except for the two Sadrist groups in
parliament. Secular non-ethnic groups also opposed the law. Sunnis seem now to
accept some form of autonomy at last for the Kurds, but remain hostile to the
idea of a Shia region in the south. They still seem to hope to be able to
introduce amendments to the law to dilute federalism, possibly through popular
referenda, but their chances of success appear slim. This issue will now
dominate the formal political spectrum, as some limited form of salvation is
perceived compared to the anarchic situation that prevails.
There is an upside, perhaps the only one available, in that the sectarian
violence should eventually diminish, insofar as it is about jockeying for
position, (as opposed to al Qaeda strivings for sectarian war against the
infidel Shi'a - and their inevitable reprisals). Once the different communities
have their own region, then the customary violent struggle for power, wealth,
and influence within that community can resume, with perhaps Saddam Hussein
'look-alikes' - strong men at any rate, scrambling to the top. But if the three
or more regions are formed and it could only be on ethnic (Kurds) and religious
distinctions (Shi'a and Sunni), with perhaps a federal capital, then the
existing horrors would before that be subsumed into ethnic cleansing, to evict
the 'wrong' residents.
Central Iraq, which is substantially mixed, is likely to be the greatest
problem. Kurdistan, no problem at all. Southern Shia Iraq, will have a Shia
government but what militia will dominate which cities, and which warlord will
triumph, is not yet clear and the Iranian dimension is an additional factor
here.
If federalism is to happen, better before the ethnic cleansing, that the removal
of communities were done whilst the western armies are still there, to at least
try to protect the civilians. All the indications now are that their presence
will not last very much longer. If the inevitable relocations are not protected
by the western forces, such is the ubiquitous fear and hatred, then a re-run of
the horrors and civilian massacres of 1947 when India and Pakistan had their
partition, could well once more besmirch the pages of history.
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